I was alerted to an important, informative new paper by Dick Lindzen on the issue of climate. The paper is R.S. Lindzen, 2102: Climate physics, feedbacks, and reductionism (and when does reductionism go too far?). Eur. Phys. J. Plus (2012) 127: 52 DOI 10.1140/epjp/i2012-12052-8.
The introduction reads (there is no abstract) [highlight added]
The public perception of the climate problem is somewhat schizophrenic. On the one hand, the problem is perceived to be so complex that it cannot be approached without massive computer programs. On the other hand, the physics is claimed to be so basic that the dire conclusions commonly presented are considered to be self-evident. Consistent with this situation, climate has become a field where there is a distinct separation of theory and modeling. Commonly, in traditional areas like fluid mechanics, theory provides useful constraints and tests when applied to modeling results. This has been notably absent in current work on climate. In principle, climate modeling should be closely associated with basic physical theory. In practice, it has come to consist in the almost blind use of obviously inadequate models.
In this paper, I would like to sketch some examples of potentially useful interaction with specific reference to the issue of climate sensitivity. It should be noted that the above situation is not strictly the fault of modelers. Theory, itself, has been increasingly idealized and esoteric with little attempt at real interaction. Also, theory in atmospheric and oceanic dynamics consists in conceptual frameworks that are generally not mathematically rigorous. Perhaps, we should refer to it as physical or conceptual reasoning instead. As we shall see, when reductionism goes beyond the constraints imposed by these frameworks, it is probably going too far though reductionism remains an essential tool of analysis.